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Abstract 
How can policymakers circumvent obstacles to taxing economic elites?  This question is critical 
for developing countries, especially in Latin America where strengthening tax capacity depends 
significantly on tapping under-taxed, highly-concentrated income and profits.  Drawing on 
diverse literatures and extensive fieldwork, the paper identifies six strategies that facilitate 
enactment of modest tax increases by mobilizing popular support and/or tempering elite 
antagonism.  Case studies from Chile, Argentina, and Bolivia illustrate the effect of these 
strategies on the fate of tax reform initiatives.  The analysis builds theory on tax politics and 
yields implications for research on reform coalitions and gradual institutional change. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Contentious debates and political battles over tax policy made headlines around the world 
in the context of the global financial crisis, precipitous budget deficits in the United States, and 
the Euro-zone debt crisis.  While these events focused attention on advanced northern 
democracies, taxation has long been a pressing and politically charged issue in the developing 
world.  The stakes are high: weak tax capacity undermines fiscal discipline and economic 
stability, and inadequate revenue restricts investment in human capital, poverty alleviation, and 
provision of basic social services. 
Revenue-raising tax reform is particularly challenging in developing countries 
characterized by extreme inequality and overreliance on consumption taxes, as is the case in 
much of Latin America.  Income in this region is heavily concentrated, not just in the top 10% of 
households, but in the very top percentiles (Alvaredo 2010).  Whereas many Latin American 
countries collect substantial revenue from consumption taxes, income is a major, under-tapped 
tax base (Gomez-Sabaini 2006).  Revenue from direct taxes on income and profits tends to be 
low not only in absolute terms, but also compared to countries with similar development levels 
(Perry et. al. 2006).  To a significant extent, raising more revenue therefore requires directly 
taxing economic elites.  Yet such initiatives impose predictable and immediate losses on 
precisely those taxpayers who are often best positioned to influence policy decisions.  
How can policy entrepreneurs circumvent obstacles to taxing economic elites?  And how 
much scope for reform can they create?  These questions are of growing interest to the 
international development community and policy practitioners,1 but they have received little 
systematic analysis in the emerging literature on tax reform in developing countries.  Tax-policy 
literature has not adequately analyzed the critical political dimensions of tax reform.  Meanwhile, 
political scientists have primarily examined value-added tax (VAT) reforms implemented during 
structural adjustment in the 1980s and 1990s, which posed distinct political challenges (Eaton 
2002, Mahon 2004).2  Comparative historical analysis on state-building identifies factors that 
contributed to direct tax capacity, including wars (Tilly 1992 and others), exclusionary racial 
cleavages (Lieberman 2003), colonial legacies (Mkandawire 2010) or other path-dependent 
processes (Kurtz 2009), and patterns of contentious politics (Slater 2010).  Yet in many 
developing countries these factors were not present or did not produce significant direct tax 
capacity, and they are unlikely candidates for effecting change in the contemporary period.3  
Literature on fiscal bargaining argues that states can extract more revenue when taxpayers are 
granted representation or participation in governance or when spending benefits them directly 
(Levi 1988, Bates and Lien 1985, Timmons 2005, Brautigam et. al. 2008).  But when taxable 
resources are extremely concentrated and governments need revenue to provide benefits for the 
broader populace, offering elites greater political participation or material benefits in exchange 
for their tax-dollars may be counterproductive.  
Drawing on diverse literatures and extensive original field research, I identify and analyze 
six strategies for taxing economic elites and argue that they can have an important causal effect 
on the fate of reform initiatives.  The strategies act through one or both of two mechanisms.  
First, they may mobilize public support, which puts electoral pressure on politicians who might 
otherwise defend the interests of economic elites.  Second, they may temper antagonism on the 
part of those economic elites who will bear the tax burden, making them more likely to accept 
reform.  When economic elites are powerful, these strategies are unlikely to make substantial tax 
increases possible.  Nevertheless, they can make the difference between no additional resources 
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and much needed if modest supplemental revenue, and the incremental reforms they facilitate 
may accumulate into significant change over time.     
My focus on direct taxation runs against policy views that prevailed in the 1980s and 
1990s, which assumed that taxing economic elites was administratively impossible and 
inherently inefficient.  However, a new policy consensus is emerging in favor of strengthening 
direct taxation, particularly for Latin America (Perry et al. 2006, Barreix et al. 2006, IMF 2011: 
40, Gomez-Sabaini et. al. 2012),4 given two key considerations.  First, tax administration has 
improved dramatically in many countries that underwent structural adjustment, and while taxing 
economic elites remains administratively challenging, specialized large-taxpayer auditing units, 
withholding regimes, tax agency access to bank information, third party reporting, and other 
innovations that reduce opportunities for evasion have made the task more feasible.  Further, 
eliminating income-tax loopholes and broadening direct tax bases simultaneously raises revenue, 
curtails avoidance, and simplifies tax administration.   Second, current research shows that the 
efficiency costs of direct taxation are not necessarily prohibitive.  In fact, progressive direct 
taxation can be optimal for raising revenue when the income distribution is heavily skewed 
(Piketty et. al 2011, Saez 2001).5  While increasing direct taxation of economic elites is most 
relevant in highly unequal countries where broad-based VATs have already been implemented, 
many of the strategies I discuss are also relevant where tax increases affecting non-elite 
taxpayers are advisable.   
Section 2 of the paper begins by outlining my theoretical framework for assessing obstacles 
to direct tax reform associated with economic elites’ political power and investment power.  
These two types of power correspond to distinct means of influence.  I then explicate strategies 
for circumventing obstacles to reform.  Many of these strategies are noted or have analogs in 
literature on welfare-state development and retrenchment in advanced industrial democracies, 
market-reform coalitions in developing and postcommunist countries, redistributive experiments 
in Latin America, and fiscal bargaining.  However, they have not been analyzed systematically 
and comprehensively with respect to the goal of taxing economic elites.  My contribution lies in 
identifying and drawing these strategies together, conceptualizing, classifying and analyzing 
them with respect to an underlying theory of how economic elites exert influence, assessing the 
strategies’ relative advantages and limitations, and identifying conditions under which they may 
be more or less successful.6 
Section 3 illustrates how these strategies can affect the fate of tax reform proposals by 
analyzing cases from Chile, Argentina, and Bolivia in which economic elites had strong political 
and/or investment power.  I argue that astute reform strategies helped governments legislate 
incremental income tax increases in Chile, whereas strategic errors ensured the failure of an 
income tax reform in Bolivia.  In Argentina, a sophisticated policy-design strategy helped the 
government redress a costly income-tax loophole; however, an intrinsic drawback of the strategy 
employed led to the reform’s repeal a year later.  The conclusion extracts comparative lessons 
regarding the importance of policy design and framing, as well as implications for research on 
economic reform and gradual institutional change. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
Investment power and political power, known respectively as structural power and 
instrumental power in business politics literature,7 correspond to two distinct means through 
which economic elites can exert influence.  Investment power creates economic obstacles to 
reform; political power creates political obstacles.  Investment power arises from concerns that a 
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reform will provoke reduced investment or capital flight, because of the market incentives the 
reform creates for profit-maximizing firms and individuals.  Reduced investment may in turn 
hurt growth and employment, thereby jeopardizing policymakers’ developmental goals and/or 
leading to punishment at the polls.  If policymakers anticipate reduced investment, they may 
therefore refrain from initiating the reform.  The defining feature of investment power is that it 
requires no organization or political action on the part of economic elites; instead, market signals 
induce coordinated reactions in the economic arena.   
In contrast, political power involves deliberate actions, like lobbying and various forms of 
collective action.  Favorable relationships with policymakers are sources of political power that 
make such actions more likely to succeed.  These relationships may include informal ties to 
policymakers; recruitment into government, whereby economic elites receive executive-branch 
appointments; and partisan linkages, whereby economic elites are a party’s core constituency—
the sector most important to the party’s political agenda (Gibson 1996).  These relationships 
enhance access to policymakers and may create bias in favor of economic elites.  Other sources 
of political power that help economic elites pursue their interests more effectively include 
organization, technical expertise, media access, and of course money.  For example, strong 
encompassing organizations help business groups unify their demands and coordinate lobbying, 
which improves their bargaining position. 
When economic elites have strong power of either type, increasing progressive direct taxes 
will be difficult; the more sources of power they possess, the greater the obstacles to reform. 
However, astute governments can legislate modest tax increases even when economic elites are 
powerful using strategies that temper elite antagonism and/or mobilize public support.  Most of 
these strategies are intimately related to reform design.  At the same time, many require 
concerted framing efforts.  While the relative importance of “crafted talk” versus policy design 
has been debated (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000, Hacker and Pierson 2005), I find that both 
components can be mutually reinforcing and critical for taxing economic elites. 
I classify six reform strategies according to their fiscal policy domain.  Tax-side strategies 
exploit characteristics of the chosen tax instrument(s).  These strategies include attenuating 
impact, obfuscating incidence, and legitimating appeals.  In contrast, benefit-side strategies 
deflect debate away from taxation by focusing attention on benefits associated with the tax 
increase, the reform package in which it is nested, or a broader policy agenda.  Benefit-side 
strategies include compensation, emphasizing stabilization, and linking to popular benefits. 
The typology in Figure 1 locates the reform strategies according to the primary mechanism 
through which they act and their fiscal policy domain.  Strategies that temper antagonism can 
make economic elites less inclined to use their political power to resist reform.  Tempering 
antagonism can also circumvent investment power by reducing the likelihood that economic 
elites will disinvest.  Strategies that mobilize public support can counterbalance economic elites’ 
political power by creating electoral incentives for politicians with whom economic elites enjoy 
favorable relationships to be less responsive to elite interests.  In accord with Collier et. al’s 
(2012) research on typologies, Figure 1 helps organize theory and concepts, synthesizes insights 
from disparate lines of research, and maps variation in the independent variable: reform 
strategies.  
--Figure 1 Here-- 
Each strategy has limitations and drawbacks.  Tempering elite antagonism may entail 
marginal revenue gains and/or fiscal cost; on the other hand, public opinion may have limited 
influence on legislators’ policy positions.  Although some strategies are complementary, others 
 	   4 
are incompatible.  And several strategies are applicable only in particular circumstances.  
Nevertheless, each strategy has facilitated reforms that otherwise may not have been possible. 	  
(a) Tax-side strategies 
The three tax-side strategies act through different means.  Attenuating impact and 
obfuscating incidence temper antagonism.  Legitimating appeals, which can be based on vertical 
equity or horizontal equity, mobilize public support; horizontal equity appeals can also temper 
elite antagonism.  
 
(i) Attenuating impact  
This strategy draws on the common-sense observation that economic elites will be less 
inclined to actively oppose, or reduce investment in response to a tax increase, the smaller its 
impact on their profits or pocket-books.  Various temporal techniques attenuate impact.  A tax 
increase can be phased-in gradually over time.  Phase-ins give firms a transition period to finish 
projects initiated under the previous tax regime and adjust to higher taxation.  Reformers can 
enact incremental tax increases spread out over time rather than attempting to pass a single more 
significant reform.  A tax increase can also be legislated to hold effect for a delimited time 
period.  These attenuation techniques can be viewed as “foot in the door” strategies (Ascher 
1984: 131).  For example, renewing temporary tax increases at a later date may incur less 
political resistance than passing the initial reform, to the extent that taxpayers become 
accustomed to the increase and/or the government can demonstrate that it has not harmed 
investment.   
However, these techniques have the obvious drawback of fiscal cost.  If a government 
needs significant revenue in the short-term, phase-ins and incremental increases may be 
undesirable.  Further, repeated recourse to temporary increases may undermine this technique, as 
taxpayers learn that temporary legislation will either be renewed or replaced with additional 
temporary tax increases.     
 
(ii) Obfuscating incidence 
Obfuscating tax incidence8 reduces taxpayers’ awareness of paying the burden.  Economic 
elites will not react against a tax increase by using their political power or by disinvesting if they 
are not conscious of how it will affect them.  Obfuscation entails selecting taxes with low 
visibility (Steinmo 1993, Wilensky 2002).  Direct taxes on income or assets tend to be highly 
visible.  When individuals file income tax returns, they are acutely aware of the tax burden 
imposed upon them.  In contrast, employers’ social security contributions have low visibility 
(Steinmo 1993: 19).  Employers pass on the cost of these taxes to employees through lower 
wages.  But because these taxes are collected from employers, wage earners generally are 
unaware that they bear the burden.9  This example illustrates a technique for reducing tax 
visibility: exploiting the phenomenon of burden-shifting, which stems from “the difference 
between the de jure and de facto incidence of taxes,” (Pierson 1994: 21).    
Obfuscating strategies have several limitations and drawbacks.  First, reducing visibility 
can introduce actual uncertainty regarding incidence.  It may not be clear whether the economic 
assumptions required to successfully exploit burden-shifting actually hold, in which case, 
taxpayers other than those intended may be affected.  Further, if a reform’s incidence becomes 
too uncertain, business actors may strongly resist because of the difficulties it creates for 
anticipating costs and planning future investments.  As Ascher (1989: 464) observes: “The 
 	   5 
frequently negative ‘reflex’ reaction to a new tax reform initiative on the part of many groups is 
typically due not just to expected losses but also to the risk of incurring costs that cannot be 
anticipated.” 
Second, reducing the visibility of taxes affecting economic elites is rarely feasible.  Elites, 
unlike average citizens, have the motivation and the resources to ascertain exactly how tax 
reforms affect their pocket books, with ample recourse to tax accountants.  As Hacker and 
Pierson (2005: 37) point out: “F. Scott Fitzgerald was right: The very rich are different—not just 
in their preferences regarding tax policy but, crucially, in their level of knowledge with respect to 
various dimensions of this complex issue.” 
 
(iii) Legitimating appeals    
Legitimating appeals draw on widely held norms, often fairness or equity.  A tax increase 
congruent with such norms has inherent legitimacy.  Legitimating appeals can mobilize public 
support and thereby pressure politicians who might otherwise defend elite interests to accept 
reform.  Wilson (1980: 370) envisages these strategies in his discussion of policies that impose 
costs on small groups but confer broad benefits, for which success “requires the efforts of a 
skilled entrepreneur who can mobilize latent public sentiment… put the opponents of the plan 
publicly on the defensive… and associate the legislation with widely shared values.”         
Legitimating appeals are more likely to succeed when political competition is strong and 
issue salience is high, such that politicians have electoral incentives to cater to marginal voters 
(Murillo 2009), and when major elections are approaching, so that citizens are more likely to 
remember politicians’ policy positions when they cast their votes (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000).  
However, the nature of political competition and voter-party linkages conditions the 
effectiveness of legitimating appeals.  Strong partisan identities, cross-cutting voter preferences, 
clientelism, and charismatic linkages may provide ample opportunities for politicians to win 
votes even if their policy positions deviate from median-voter preferences.10  For these reasons, 
strategies for cultivating public support tend to influence tax politics only at the margins when 
economic elites enjoy strong political power.  Despite these caveats, legitimating appeals can 
help governments legislate reforms that might not otherwise be feasible.  
 
Vertical Equity 
Vertical equity is the principle that taxpayers who earn more or own more assets should 
bear a larger share of the tax burden—that is, taxation should be progressive.  Reforms that are 
not only progressive but also highly targeted at elites are especially well-suited for vertical 
equity appeals.  Targeting refers to how exclusively a tax increase affects upper-income sectors 
as opposed to middle- or lower-income sectors.  Increasing the top marginal income tax rate 
targets elites more than reducing minimum allowances for all income tax payers.  Likewise, 
excise taxes on luxury goods are more elite-targeted than VAT increases, which affect 
consumers more broadly.  While elite-targeted tax increases are inherently progressive, not all 
progressive tax increases are highly elite-targeted.     
Vertical equity appeals will be more effective when tax increases narrowly target elites.  
Where income is extremely concentrated, even a reform that affects only the top income decile 
may include individuals who can be construed as “middle class”—usually professionals who are 
not manifestly “rich” according to cultural norms or international comparison.  Economic elites 
and their political allies often frame tax increases as affecting the “middle class” to justify their 
opposition.  Such assertions are harder to sustain the more elite-targeted the reform. 
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However, economic elites may be able to shape public opinion to their own ends by 
framing tax increases in terms of principles other than vertical equity, even in highly unequal 
societies where the vast majority would be unaffected by the tax increase.  For example, Birney 
and Shapiro (2005) find that proponents of estate tax repeal in the United States successfully 
framed the tax as a “death tax,” connoting moral inappropriateness, rather than a tax on 
extraordinary wealth.    
Further, while vertical equity appeals can mobilize public support, they pose the potential 
drawback of provoking more intense elite opposition.  Although targeting and visibility need not 
co-vary, elite-targeted taxes are often highly visible and may therefore exacerbate elite 
antagonism.   
 
Horizontal Equity    
Horizontal equity implies that taxpayers of similar economic means should bear similar tax 
burdens, regardless of their income sources.  Examples of reforms that improve horizontal equity 
include eliminating sector-specific corporate tax benefits and broadening personal income tax 
bases to include non-wage income sources.  Anti-evasion reforms also improve horizontal equity 
by ensuring that all taxpayers pay their due burden. 
Because many reforms that enhance horizontal equity also enhance vertical equity, appeals 
to both principles can often be used simultaneously.  Anti-evasion measures are a prominent 
example of reforms that facilitate both types of appeals.  Middle or lower-income sectors have 
little opportunity for income tax evasion since taxes are withheld directly from their wages, 
whereas upper-income sectors receive significant income from non-wage sources and can under-
declare those earnings on tax returns.  Eliminating exemptions for sources of income accruing 
disproportionately to the wealthy, such as rents, interest, and capital gains, also enhances both 
horizontal and vertical equity.  
In addition to mobilizing public support, horizontal equity appeals can temper elite 
antagonism.  By definition, reforms that improve horizontal equity affect some taxpayers but not 
others and may hence avoid provoking broad opposition.  Moreover, horizontal equity appeals 
are one of the few strategies that can generate support from economic elites.  Anti-evasion 
reforms often elicit support from law-abiding firms, who view tax evasion as unfair competition.  
Eliminating sectoral tax benefits can generate support from sectors that do not enjoy those 
benefits.  However, where the business community is highly cohesive, support for eliminating 
sector-specific benefits may be passive at best.  Moreover, eliminating sectoral exemptions 
generally provokes intense opposition from those affected (Ascher 1984, Olson 1965).   
 
(b) Benefit-side strategies 
Benefit-side strategies aim to shift attention away from tax increases.  I classify these 
strategies according to who receives the benefits: economic elites who will bear the tax increase, 
popular sectors, or members of both groups.  With a few exceptions, benefit-side strategies 
explicitly invoke or tacitly rely on the neoliberal imperative of fiscal discipline to draw 
connections between taxation and benefits.   
 
(i) Linking to popular benefits   
Welfare-state literature advocates linking to popular benefits to minimize public opposition 
to broad-based taxes (Steinmo 1993, Wilensky 2002); I focus on this strategy’s potential to 
mobilize public support for elite-targeted taxes.  The logic is similar to tax-side legitimacy 
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appeals.  Whereas the latter strategies emphasize a tax increase’s inherent legitimacy, linking to 
popular benefits invokes legitimacy derived from the benefits the tax increase will finance.  A 
prominent example is social spending, which often does not benefit economic elites in 
developing countries due to means-testing and/or elite preferences for private services.  Linking 
strategies allow the executive to blame legislators who oppose reform for blocking popular 
benefits.  Linking can also create political payoffs for legislators who support reform by letting 
them share credit for popular programs (Boylan 1996).   
Linking can be achieved through discourse and/or reform design.  Discourse alone is the 
weakest approach.  Several techniques make links between taxation and benefits more evident 
and more credible.  First, popular benefits and tax increases can be included within a single 
reform package so that they are debated simultaneously.  Second, if the executive has exclusive 
initiative on fiscal policy, benefits can be made contingent on tax increases: a reform can be 
designed such that rejecting the tax increase automatically prevents spending measures from 
taking effect.  Third, revenue from tax increases can be formally earmarked.    
The potential for linking strategies to mobilize public support and hence their likelihood of 
success depends on features of the associated benefits.  The more visible, easily understood, 
immediate, and broad-based the benefits, the more support they are likely to elicit, and the 
greater the pressure on legislators to approve tax increases.  As emphasized in welfare-state 
literature, universal benefits generate broader support than means-targeted benefits (Pierson 
1994, Wilensky 2002, Huber and Stephens 2012).  However, benefits targeting the poor and 
groups viewed as particularly deserving or vulnerable may generate broad support based on 
norms of equity or morality.  Public support may also depend on whether citizens perceive that 
the state has the administrative capacity and probity to ensure that benefits reach intended 
recipients.  
Linking strategies can be more effective than tax-side legitimating appeals for pressuring 
legislators to approve tax increases.  First, popular benefits like social spending will inherently 
draw greater attention and be perceived as more important by the public than elite-targeted tax 
reforms, which in and of themselves do not directly affect citizens at large.11  Second, to exert 
electoral control over politicians, voters must perceive negative outcomes, associate them with 
policy decisions, and identify who is to blame (Arnold 1990, Hacker and Pierson 2005).  Tight 
linking to spending through reform design helps voters follow these cognitive steps by raising 
awareness of the negative consequences of failing to tax elites, helping voters associate those 
negative consequences with failed reform, and making it easy to identify reform opponents.   
Linking to popular benefits nevertheless has drawbacks.  Earmarking may be technically 
undesirable because it creates budgetary rigidities (Bird and Jun 2005) and politically 
undesirable because it limits discretionary spending.  Further, as Ascher (1989: 446) notes, “the 
directly redistributive nature of taxation becomes all the more obvious” when tax increases are 
linked to popular benefits.  Therefore, like vertical equity appeals, linking to targeted spending 
may exacerbate elite antagonism.   
 
(ii) Linking to universal benefits: Emphasizing stabilization 
These strategies temper elite antagonism by emphasizing public goods that appeal to elites, 
such as national security or prestige,12 socio-political stability, or economic stability.  While 
these strategies may also generate public support for taxing elites, their role in tempering elite 
antagonism is particularly important.  I focus on economic stabilization, which has been critical 
in developing countries and is now salient in many developed countries as well.    
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Emphasizing stabilization aims to convince elites that impending or actual economic crisis 
is more costly than a heavier tax burden.  The observation that economic crisis and especially 
hyperinflation dispose elites to tolerate increased taxation or other economic reforms is common 
in literature on structural adjustment (Acuña 1994, Weyland 2002).   
Various conditions must hold for emphasizing stabilization to succeed.  First, elites must 
perceive instability as imminent.  A recent history of crises may increase elites’ receptiveness to 
warnings that economic instability will ensue if fiscal discipline is neglected.  Second, elites 
must perceive instability as costly; fiscal indiscipline may threaten to undermine economic 
models or governments that economic elites support.  If elites do not feel vulnerable, they have 
little reason to accept a tax increase.  Elites may have options for minimizing the costs of 
instability like moving their assets off shore.  Third, elites must be convinced that fiscal 
discipline cannot be achieved without increasing taxes.  Privatization, austerity, reducing state 
corruption, and international loans or aid must not be perceived as feasible short-term options.   
 
(iii) Compensation      
These strategies provide benefits for economic elites that range from cutting other taxes 
that economic elites oppose, to subsidies or spending that directly benefits elites, to reforms 
elites advocate in other policy areas.  Compensation is a central idea in fiscal-bargaining 
literature and market-reform literature.  Fiscal-bargaining literature highlights “contracts” in 
which privileged groups accept tax obligations in exchange for “side payments,” including 
services or other concessions (Levi 1988: 64).  Market-reform literature illustrates that 
compensation can effectively mitigate elite opposition to reforms in policy areas including trade 
liberalization and privatization (Corrales 1998, Schamis 1999, Shleifer and Treisman 2000, 
Etchemendy 2011).  Kingstone’s (2001) concept of “policy bundling” can be viewed as a type of 
compensation, in which simultaneous or closely sequenced reforms that business supports reduce 
resistance to reforms that might stimulate opposition if introduced in isolation from a broader 
reform agenda.   
The type and scope of compensations needed to temper elite antagonism depend on their 
sources of power.  If economic elites are organized and cohesive, inclusive compensations may 
be necessary; if they are fragmented, compensating a few key groups may suffice.  Generally, the 
stronger and more numerous the sources of power, the more significant compensations must be.   
Earmarking or contingency techniques can formalize the bargain and increase leverage for 
securing cooperation from politicians who have strong relationships with economic elites.  
Compensation can also circumvent investment power.  If a tax increase is accompanied by 
or linked to pro-growth measures, it is less likely to provoke disinvestment or capital flight.  
Taxes are one of many policies affecting profits, and favorable policies in other areas may offset 
the costs of higher taxation (Gelleny and McCoy 2001, Hacker and Pierson 2002). 
Potential drawbacks of compensation include unwanted fiscal cost, particularly if revenue 
is needed for redistributive purposes.  The drawbacks of earmarking apply as well, but if 
compensations are negotiated outside of the tax reform package, elites must perceive a credible 
commitment and government capacity to deliver the benefits.       
 
3. CASE STUDIES   
Chile, Argentina, and Bolivia enacted some of Latin America’s most extensive market-
oriented tax reforms during structural adjustment; by the mid-1990s, their VAT revenue as a 
percentage of GDP reached European averages.  Yet they experienced recurrent revenue needs in 
 	   9 
subsequent decades, and governments in each country attempted to “go where the money is” by 
increasing direct taxes.  Overall, Argentina legislated more substantial direct tax increases than 
Chile and Bolivia, contrary to arguments linking institutional instability or weakness to low 
direct taxation.13  I argue elsewhere that the power of economic elites—especially business 
actors—explains much of this aggregate cross-national variation.  
However, reform strategies play an important role in explaining whether governments were 
able to legislate modest direct tax increases in contexts of strong business power.  The four 
income-tax reforms analyzed below, drawn from a larger set of 26 tax-reform packages, were 
selected to illustrate a variety of strategies and outcomes, holding the strength of business power 
roughly constant.  In each case, business actors had multiple sources of power that posed major 
obstacles to reform.  I first consider two comparatively successful cases of modest tax increases 
in Chile.  Legitimating appeals helped the Lagos administration pass income-tax base-
broadening measures in 2001 and 2005, despite business’ strong political power.  I next consider 
a case of temporally-limited success from Argentina.  Although economic elites were generally 
much weaker in Argentina, financial-sector elites had strong investment power and political 
power during the 1990s that created obstacles to taxing interest earnings.  Obfuscating incidence 
allowed the Menem administration to circumvent these obstacles in 1998; however, an inherent 
drawback associated with the burden-shifting technique—lack of consensus over the actual 
incidence of the new tax that was created—led to its repeal in 1999.  Finally, I examine a case in 
which strategic errors contributed to resounding defeat: Bolivia’s notorious 2003 income tax 
proposal.  The government’s insufficient recourse to vertical equity appeals in conjunction with a 
reform design that was neither patently progressive nor adequately elite-targeted fostered 
confusion over tax incidence and contributed to protest by popular sectors that the government 
never intended to tax.14  
(a) Methods 
I assess how and to what extent reform strategies affected proposal outcomes through 
process tracing.  This qualitative method entails careful use of evidence about context, 
mechanisms, and sequences, which I draw from in-depth interviews with government officials, 
politicians, and business leaders, along with primary documents and news articles.  The inference 
process can be formalized as a sequence of tests where each piece of diagnostic evidence 
increases or decreases the plausibility of the hypothesis under consideration.  Methodologists 
have classified these tests into distinct types based on the logical connections between the 
evidence and the hypothesis in question as well as implications for rival (or null) hypotheses 
(Bennett 2010, Collier 2011, Goertz and Mahoney 2012).  Appendix 1 not only reviews the key 
ideas in this methodological literature, but also explicitly guides the reader through the multiple 
process-tracing tests that form the basis for my analysis of Chile’s 2005 tax reform; process-
tracing practitioners usually leave these tests informal and implicit for the sake of presenting 
readable analytical narratives.  The same logic described in Appendix 1 underpins the analysis of 
each case study presented below. 
In addition to process tracing, I draw on case knowledge to assess what would have 
happened had the strategy in question been applied differently or not at all (Fearon 1991, George 
and Bennett 2010).  This counterfactual analysis is appropriate since policymakers plausibly 
could have acted differently at the time, and considering this possibility does not entail altering 
other key elements of the historical record (Goertz and Mahoney 2012).   
It bears emphasis that the bulk of my causal leverage comes from within-case analysis (and 
for Chile, comparisons across the two reform cases), not from cross-country comparisons.  The 
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value of analyzing cases from multiple countries lies instead in demonstrating the causal 
importance of reform strategies across different political contexts and levels of development.   
 
(b) Chile’s modest successes  
Business’s strong political power made it difficult for Chile’s center-left governments to 
legislate tax increases in the 1990s and 2000s.  Business power arose primarily from 
organization and partisan ties (Fairfield 2010).  Chile’s prestigious economy-wide business 
association, the CPC, coordinated lobbying across sectors on sensitive issues like taxation, which 
business often portrayed as confiscation of property.  Further, business was a core constituency 
for the two right parties, especially the UDI.  The UDI’s neoliberal, low-tax policy positions 
drew electoral and financial support from business owners (Luna 2010).  The UDI and dominant 
business groups were also linked through common origins in the Pinochet dictatorship; 
government technocrats who later joined the UDI were often board members of business groups 
that benefited from privatization (Silva 1996, Schamis 1999).  The right, which was essentially 
tied with the center-left in the senate during Lagos’ administration (2000-05), often took 
instruction on tax policy directly from business, and business and the right mounted coordinated 
opposition (interviews: Tax Agency 2005, Finance Ministry.a 2007).  Increasing taxes therefore 
entailed costly political battles.     
 When center-left governments sought to increase the low direct tax burden born by 
economic elites, they employed multiple strategies, among which equity appeals were often 
prominent.  Equity appeals created political space for incremental advances despite strong 
business power.  As the two cases illustrate, equity appeals undermined business-right opposition 
more effectively during electoral periods, particularly when inequality became a salient 
campaign issue.   
Authors have argued that Chile’s institutionalized party system and stable rules of the game 
create incentives for cooperation and consensus-building in congress (Flores-Macías 2010).  Yet 
modest success in these cases cannot be attributed solely to institutions: the right opposed similar 
reforms on multiple prior occasions.     
 
(i) Anti-evasion reform    
Strategic reform design and associated equity appeals helped the Lagos administration 
legislate the 2001 Anti-Evasion reform, which secured around 1% of GDP per year, a major 
success in the Chilean context though modest in cross-national context.  Equity appeals helped 
the government legislate the reform overall and the income-tax measures, which I emphasize 
below.  However, equity appeals did not preclude extended conflict with business and the right.  
Although the former Finance Minister (interview, 2007) observed that “the big money is in 
direct taxes,” the administration decided to raise revenue primarily by fighting indirect-tax 
evasion to avoid antagonizing business.  However, the government also sought to curtail 
technically unjustified income-tax benefits that facilitated tax avoidance.  The administration 
anticipated that these income-tax base-broadening measures, which targeted large corporations 
and business owners, would be highly controversial.    
To manage business-right opposition, the government employed vertical and horizontal 
equity appeals.  In terms of vertical equity, President Lagos stressed that evasion favored the rich 
at the expense of the poor, (El Mercurio 2000a, 2001a).  He recalled: “I would say: when you go 
to buy a kilo of bread, you pay 18% VAT.  You have no trick, no mechanism for paying less.  
The poor pay all their taxes.  And it is just [fair] that the rich pay all their taxes,” (interview, 
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Lagos 2007).  Regarding horizontal equity, the government asserted: “Tax evasion entails great 
inequity between those who comply with their tax obligations and those who do not.  …from an 
ethical perspective, no one can oppose an initiative that pursues compliance with the law,” 
(Lagos and Eyzaguirre 2000).  Chile’s center-left governments routinely linked tax increases to 
social spending; this reform was no exception.  However, the Anti-Evasion reform’s inherent 
legitimacy was so compelling that “the discussion was more about ethics than the purpose of the 
funds,” (interview, Lagos 2007).  
The government extended these appeals to the income-tax measures.  This approach 
entailed equating tax avoidance with tax evasion in terms of impropriety, even though avoidance 
does not break the law.  A private sector (a 2005) informant complained: “[the government] 
deliberately mixed and confused tax avoidance, tax planning, evasion, and immorality… there 
was a policy of confusing language in order to legitimate persecution of legal practices.”  
Framing the income-tax measures as curtailing morally unacceptable behavior rather than simply 
raising revenue aimed to delegitimate business-right opposition.  Executive-branch officials 
consistently denied that the reform contained tax increases.  When asked why the government 
had initiated a tax reform, the Finance Minister replied: “I do not agree that this is a tax reform.  
Fundamentally what we have designed is a campaign against evasion,” (El Mercurio 2000b).   
Available evidence suggests that equity appeals helped the government maneuver the 
package through congress.  To justify opposing the income-tax measures, the right was in the 
disadvantageous position of explaining the subtle difference between evasion and avoidance; the 
vast majority of citizens had no experience with these practices.  Key government informants 
attested that the strategy put pressure on the right and created space for legislative modifications 
that otherwise would not have been possible.  The former senate president asserted that the right 
was in an “absolutely defensive position… they were looking for any possible argument” against 
the reform (interview, PDC 2007).  Similarly, the former tax agency director (interview, 2005), 
who participated in multiple negotiations on the bill, recalled: “Lagos was in the press every day 
saying everybody must pay taxes. …The right asked the government to stop that, because they 
were associated with illegal things, being selfish, fraud. ...It was a political battle that I think we 
won.”   
More decisive evidence comes from statements by right politicians.  The two right senators 
on the Finance Committee told the press that they abstained instead of voting against the reform 
because: “otherwise, President Lagos would have said that the opposition is against combatting 
tax evasion,” (El Mercurio 2001b).  One of these senators later elaborated: “the [bill’s] title—
evasion—it suggests going after criminals.  It’s very difficult to oppose someone who presents 
that framing,” (interview, Prat 2005).  Ultimately, the government secured abstentions on the 
reform package—tacit acceptance—from seven right senators.       
However, equity appeals were not sufficient to pass the income-tax measures.  This 
strategy failed to temper business antagonism toward these measures, although business did 
support many of the strictly anti-evasion initiatives.  And efforts to mobilize public support did 
not compel the right to break ranks with business, despite the President’s threats to make the 
reform an issue in the parliamentary elections scheduled for the end of the year (El Mercurio 
2000a).  The right held up the reform in the Senate until the executive negotiated concessions 
that placated business.15  And most of the right senators voted against the two most controversial 
of the seven income-tax measures during the line-item vote after the overall reform initiative was 
approved.16    
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Why did the government’s strategy have a limited, though still important, effect on the 
right?  One possibility, which cannot be directly assessed for lack of public opinion data, is that 
equity appeals did not generate strong public support.  Yet the government did not include the 
reform in its private polls given an expectation of overwhelming support for fighting evasion 
(interview, FDD 2010), and evidence presented above suggests that right legislators perceived 
public receptiveness to the government’s framing strategy.  A more compelling explanation for 
the limited effect of equity appeals in this case lies in the nature of voter-party linkages and the 
timing of reform.  First, the UDI’s segmented electoral strategy gave it leeway to defend the 
interests of its core constituency without necessarily alienating its mass base.  Whereas the UDI 
attracts upper-income voters through programmatic linkages, it attracts lower-income voters 
through district-level clientelism and charismatic appeals, not economic policies (Luna 2010).  
Therefore, the UDI could afford to ignore mass public opinion on tax equity without necessarily 
incurring electoral costs.  Second, the parliamentary elections were many months away, giving 
voters ample time to forget the right’s position on the Anti-Evasion reform and the right ample 
time to draw attention to other issues.  Despite these limitations, the case evidence along with the 
governing coalition’s prior difficulties legislating similar reforms suggests that without equity 
appeals, the right’s bargaining position would have been stronger and the government would 
have had to make even greater concessions.      
 
(ii) Stockholder tax subsidy  
Legitimating appeals helped the government legislate another income-tax base-broadening 
measure in 2005.  Given the unusually high salience of inequality during a presidential 
campaign, vertical equity appeals generated much stronger electoral incentives for the right to 
deviate from its core business constituency’s preferences.   
The tax benefit known as “57 bis,” inherited from the dictatorship, constituted a perpetual 
government subsidy for owners of new-issue stocks, most of whom belonged to the wealthiest 
percentile of taxpayers.  The Lagos administration considered eliminating 57 bis in the Anti-
Evasion reform, but it was judged infeasible given strong business-right resistance (interview, 
Finance Ministry.c 2005).  Efforts to eliminate the exemption in the 1990s also failed. 
An opportunity for reform arose in 2005 due to unanticipated electoral competition from 
the right on the issue of inequality.  When Chile’s Catholic bishops forcefully denounced the 
country’s persistent inequality, right-coalition presidential candidate Lavín blamed lack of 
progress on the center-left: “Inequality, Mr. President, continues.  …There is a Chile that grows, 
but it is for the few, and the great majority have not yet benefited,” (El Mercurio 2005a).  
Inequality became the central campaign issue during the following weeks.  President Lagos 
responded with a challenge: “The infamous article 57 bis represents a tremendous support for 
inequality…  Instead of just talking, why don’t we agree to eliminate 57 bis in less than 24 
hours?” (El Mercurio 2005b).   
This vertical equity appeal proved highly successful.  In contrast to the Anti-Evasion 
reform, debate on 57 bis was minimal.  Lavín accepted the government’s challenge: “…we are 
all for equity.  Let’s do it,” (El Mercurio 2005c), and right legislators followed his lead, 
disregarding business’s policy preferences.  The bill received nearly unanimous congressional 
approval.    
The salience of inequality during the campaign raised the anticipated political costs to the 
right of defending business interests.  Opposing the reform would have undermined Lavín’s 
credibility and validated the government’s claim that the right was the main obstacle to reducing 
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inequality in Chile.  With only six months until the election and public attention focused on 
inequality, voters might well have remembered the coalition’s policy position and punished 
Lavín at the polls.  Lavín’s advisors attributed Lagos’ narrow 1999 victory to the right’s rejection 
of a popular labor-rights bill sent to congress during the campaign; this episode weighed heavily 
in the right’s analysis of the 2005 reform (El Mercurio 2005d, 2005e).  Comparing the two 
reforms, a Lavín advisor declared: “The center-right is not willing to fall into the 1999 trap 
again,” (El Mercurio 2005e).  Meanwhile, framing the tax increase as hurting the middle class, a 
tactic regularly used by the right, was not feasible because the reform patently targeted elites.  
Tax agency data showed that 0.5% of adults received 72% of the tax expenditure associated with 
57 bis.  As a government informant recalled: “it was a pure transfer of resources to rich people; 
there was no way to argue differently.  …It was not possible for the right to oppose the reform 
after making that argument about inequality,” (interview, Finance Ministry.b 2005).  An UDI 
(interview, 2005) informant candidly acknowledged that electoral concerns motivated the right to 
accept the reform: “the opposition demonstrated that this time it would accept things that usually 
it was not disposed to accept so as not to harm the presidential option—in this case it would do 
something popular, perhaps populist.”  The counterfactual therefore seems clear: had the 
government attempted to eliminate 57 bis without the high-profile equity appeal, the right would 
have blocked the reform as it had on multiple prior occasions.  
 
(c) Argentina’s temporally-limited success: Tax on corporate debt 
Argentine policymakers faced different constraints that precluded eliminating a regressive 
income-tax exemption for interest earnings in the 1990s: bank-depositors’ investment power, as 
well as the banking association’s political power.17  Obfuscating incidence helped government 
technocrats enact an alternative reform intended to accomplish the same goal, yet their success 
was short-lived given lack of consensus regarding the actual incidence of the new tax, a 
drawback of the burden-shifting technique employed.  
Argentine economists concurred that interest earnings on savings accounts and corporate 
bonds should be taxed.  The income-tax exemption entailed a non-trivial revenue loss and 
amounted to a state subsidy for corporate debt.  Politicians across party lines also agreed that 
interest should be taxed; Argentina has no electorally-relevant right party, and legislators often 
complained that the exemption unfairly favored the rich.   
However, there was widespread concern that eliminating the tax exemption would provoke 
disinvestment from the banks.  Savings in Argentina were physically mobile as well as 
electronically mobile; wealthy Buenos Aires residents could easily open tax-free savings 
accounts in Uruguay’s nearby financial centers.  Pervasive lack of confidence in the security of 
deposits, due to Argentina’s history of hyperinflation, bank failures, and state interventions that 
confiscated savings, exacerbated potential incentives to move mobile assets abroad.  The 
perceived disinvestment threat was particularly troublesome because massive withdrawals would 
have destabilized not only the banks, but also the broader economy; the financial sector was 
central to Argentina’s economic model in the 1990s while the peso was pegged to the dollar.  
Meanwhile, the financial sector enjoyed strong political power during the 1990s thanks to 
recruitment into government and informal ties to policymakers.  The Secretary of Finance during 
Menem’s first administration was a former banking-association president, and economists from 
think tanks linked to the financial sector were appointed to the Economy Ministry and the 
Central Bank.  The banking association defended the interest-earnings exemption and used its 
political power to lobby against reform for fear of losing customers.  
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During Menem’s second administration, Economy Ministry technocrats designed a reform 
to tax interest earnings that circumvented these constraints.  They proposed a tax on corporate 
debt, which would tax interest payments made by firms, rather than interest earned by 
individuals.  This design obfuscated incidence via burden-shifting.  Technocrats argued that the 
new tax would have the same incidence as including interest earnings in the personal income tax 
base, because the tax burden would be transferred from corporate debtors to individual creditors 
through interest rates.  If interest were included in the income tax base, banks would have to 
offer higher rates of return to their depositors, which they would compensate by charging higher 
interest rates on loans to firms.  Applying a tax on corporate debt would have the same outcome: 
higher effective interest rates on loans to firms.  The new tax was intended to make taxation of 
interest earnings less visible to investors, and hence less likely to motivate flight from the banks 
and less likely to stimulate opposition from the financial sector and legislators.  
Obfuscating incidence allowed the executive to successfully legislate the reform in 1999.  
The financial sector accepted the new tax with minimal resistance (interview, Economy 
Ministry.a 2006).  To win the sector’s acquiescence, Economy Ministry officials explicitly 
presented the reform as an alternative to eliminating personal income tax interest exemption: “we 
said, ‘look, we came up with this tax on debt because what we thought about doing before was 
eliminating the exemption,’ and of course, they told us ‘yes, that would be much worse than the 
tax on debt,’” (interview, Economy Ministry.b 2006).  Financial-sector informants confirmed 
that assessment (ADEBA, ABA 2006).  The tax on corporate debt also precluded resistance from 
governing-coalition legislators who feared that eliminating the income-tax exemption would 
cause capital flight.  References to any potential negative impact on bank deposits were 
essentially absent from discussion of the tax in the press and in congress.  In fact, few legislators 
understood that the tax burden would be transferred to interest earnings (interview, Economy 
Ministry.a 2006); it was perceived instead as a corporate tax increase.  A longtime senator with 
tax expertise recalled: “It was like learning Aramaic or some other extinct ancient language; no 
one understood what it was about,” (interview, Baglini 2006).       
Despite the legislative success, the obfuscation strategy had a major drawback that led to 
the reform’s untimely demise: the attempt to exploit burden-shifting created uncertainty about 
the actual incidence of the new tax.  Economists from the opposition coalition did not believe the 
assumptions needed to make taxing debt equivalent to taxing interest earnings actually held 
(interviews: Economy Ministry.c 2007, .d 2006).  They felt the tax on debt imposed an undue 
burden on small businesses, which already faced much higher interest rates than big firms.  
Accordingly, the tax was phased-out after the opposition won power in 1999.  While the new 
government’s economists agreed that interest should be taxed, continued concerns regarding 
investment power precluded reform.  Interest earnings remain untaxed as of this writing.   
Strategic drawbacks aside, however, this evidence supports a strong counterfactual: no 
obfuscation, no interest-earnings taxation.   
  
(d) Bolivia’s failed income tax initiative   
Whereas an inherent strategy limitation undermined Argentina’s tax on debt, poor reform 
design and inadequate vertical equity appeals—the natural strategy choice—ensured the failure 
of Bolivia’s 2003 income tax proposal.  Instead of mobilizing public support, the initiative 
incited unanticipated popular protest.   
President Sanchez de Lozada (2002-03) faced countervailing pressures from economic 
elites and popular sectors.  Economic elites enjoyed strong political power during the early 2000s 
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prior to indigenous leader Evo Morales’ electoral victory.  Elites had extensive informal ties to 
the traditional parties that together held a majority in congress (MNR, and MIR, and ADN), and 
strong encompassing organizations facilitated collective action by business actors (Conaghan and 
Malloy 1994, Gamarra and Malloy 1995, Eaton 2007).  Business associations denounced tax 
increases, arguing that the large, primarily indigenous informal sector should be incorporated 
into the tax base instead (interview, CEPB 2006).  On the other hand, highly-mobilized popular 
sectors demanded redistributive policies and political inclusion.  During this period, Bolivia 
experienced a “continuous cycle of protest” (Barr 2005) involving indigenous organizations, 
civic associations, labor unions, and Morales’ indigenous-left party.  These groups pressed 
different demands, but all rejected the neoliberal economic model and the exclusionary 
traditional party system.   
Given the likelihood of mass protest, broad-based consumption taxes were not an option 
for closing the budget deficit that Sanchez de Lozada inherited when he took office.  This reality 
along with technical considerations compelled the government to propose creating an individual 
income tax,18 notwithstanding economic elites’ strong political power.  The tax would apply a 
flat rate of 12.5% on income exceeding a fixed threshold, such that the effective tax rates paid 
would be progressive, rising from 3% to 11% (interview, Finance Ministry.d 2006).  Although 
technocrats recommended a threshold of four to six times the minimum wage, Sanchez de 
Lozada sent the proposal to congress with a threshold equivalent to twice the minimum wage to 
leave room for bargaining with legislators (interview, Finance Ministry.e 2007).  Yet given the 
tiny size of the formal sector, the proposed tax would still affect fewer than 6% of Bolivians. 
The business associations denounced the income tax as recessionary and prepared to lobby 
against it (La Razón 2003b, 2003e).  But ironically, popular protest against the tax forced the 
government to withdraw the proposal before business opposition gained momentum.  Police, 
teachers unions, and university students clashed with the military for two days in the capital, 
while indigenous organizations and future president Morales condemned the tax and planned 
additional demonstrations (La Razón 2003a, 2003c).  Labor leaders lamented: “once again the 
burden of economic responsibility is placed on the shoulders of the workers,” (La Razón 2003c).  
Indigenous leader Quispe even decried that peasants would ultimately bear the tax burden (La 
Razón 2003e).  Notwithstanding these assertions, most of the protesters earned salaries below the 
threshold and would not have been affected by the tax (interviews: Finance Ministry.d 2006, .e 
2007).  
Many factors, including accumulated grievances and broad anti-government sentiments, 
helped catalyze the income-tax protest.  However, the government’s strategic errors played a 
critical role.  The reform design undermined the inherent legitimacy it should have enjoyed, and 
the government did not sufficiently emphasize vertical equity.  Because the tax had a flat rate 
instead of a progressive bracket structure, it was incorrectly perceived as regressive and unfair.  
And the threshold of only twice the minimum wage suggested that the tax was broad-based, even 
though the vast majority earned far less than that threshold.  Media coverage reinforced these 
misperceptions.  A prominent newspaper headline read: “Everyone alike will pay 12.5% of their 
salary,” (La Razón 2003f).  Even the government’s own statements portrayed the tax as broad-
based.  Although Sanchez de Lozada explained that the tax would affect the rich rather than the 
poor, he stated that it would touch middle-income sectors: “we have asked the middle class to 
assume this sacrifice,” (La Razón 2003d).  This “middle class” in reality comprised a tiny, 
privileged group of highly-paid wage-earners and independent professionals.   
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A visibly progressive, more narrowly elite-targeted tax combined with concerted equity 
appeals could have prevented the proposal from becoming a target of mass opposition.  In fact, a 
2004 wealth tax initiative that satisfied these criteria elicited no popular condemnation.19  Protest 
may still have occurred against the stagnant public-sector wages in the 2003 budget that was 
simultaneously sent to congress, but the government probably would not have had to withdraw 
the tax proposal.  In retrospect, government technocrats recognized these errors.  One informant 
asserted: “If we had sent it [the bill] with [a threshold of] six [minimum wages], a lot of 
arguments [against the tax] would have fallen apart automatically,” (interview, Finance 
Ministry.d 2006).  Another lamented the government’s insufficient efforts to explain the tax to 
the public (interview, Finance Ministry.e 2007).   
Although a more targeted tax would have raised less revenue, governments could have 
broadened the base and/or increased the rate in the future; Chilean governments often used this 
incremental approach.  Instead, the failed proposal gravely damaged prospects for implementing 
an income tax in Bolivia.  Technocrats in the Mesa and Morales administrations agreed that 
Bolivia needs a personal income tax, but no government has dared introduce a tax that in any 
way resembles Sanchez de Lozada’s failed initiative, however narrow the base, for fear of 
renewed protest (interviews: Finance Ministry.f 2007, .h 2006).   
In the absence of popular protest, Sanchez de Lozada would still have faced a battle with 
business and the traditional political parties.  However, in Sanchez de Lozada’s (interview, 2010) 
own view, his authority over the governing coalition at that time was strong enough to force a 
modest, patently elite-targeted tax through congress.   
 
e) Comparative overview 
Business power was strong in each of the cases examined, although the types and sources 
of power differed.  Strong business power posed major obstacles to direct tax increases.  In Chile 
and Argentina, governments had considered income-tax base-broadening initiatives in prior 
years, but ruled them out as infeasible given active business resistance and/or fears of 
disinvestment.  In Bolivia, business also had strong sources of power that made income-tax 
reform difficult.   
I have argued that reform strategies played an important role in influencing proposal 
outcomes.  Chile achieved modest successes with the help of carefully-crafted equity appeals, 
although the nature of right party-voter linkages tempered their impact.  These appeals proved 
more effective when equity became highly salient during electoral campaigns, giving politicians 
stronger incentives to worry about public opinion.  Argentina achieved temporally-limited 
success at taxing interest-earnings.  Obfuscating incidence tempered the powerful financial 
sector’s resistance to reform, but lack of consensus over the true incidence of the new tax 
contributed to its subsequent demise.  And in Bolivia, inadequate equity appeals and insufficient 
elite-targeting contributed to the income-tax initiative’s dramatic failure.      
It is worth stressing that other factors contributed to these outcomes.  Business and the right 
in Chile accepted income-tax base-broadening measures not just because the government’s 
equity appeals undermined their resistance, but also because the government made concessions.  
Argentina’s tax on debt might not have been so readily overturned had the country’s party 
system and institutions created stronger incentives for cross-partisan compromise and resolute 
policymaking, as in Chile.20  And the protest that killed Bolivia’s income-tax proposal reflected 
widespread discontent with the government and a party system in upheaval, as well as 
misperceptions regarding who would pay the tax.  Yet none of these factors negate the causal 
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contribution of the reform strategies employed.  The Chilean government likely would have been 
forced to make even greater concessions without equity appeals.  Given the consensus that 
interest earnings should be taxed, Argentine policymakers would not have been motivated to 
repeal the tax designed to obfuscate incidence had they not harbored serious concerns over who 
actually bore the burden.  And it is hard to imagine that Bolivian protesters would have included 
among their grievances a tax that narrowly and visibly targeted the very economic elites whose 
dominance and privilege they sought to challenge.  
A common theme emerging from the case studies is the importance of incidence 
perceptions and potential difficulties or tradeoffs involved in managing them.  In Argentina, 
taxpayers’ lack of awareness and legislators’ inability to understand tax incidence facilitated 
legislation of the tax on debt, yet lack of consensus on incidence among technocrats led to the 
reform’s repeal.  In Bolivia, popular misperceptions about incidence sealed the income tax’s 
demise.  Yet a patently progressive, highly-targeted tax could have elicited more intense 
opposition from economic elites.  In Chile, business recognized that income tax base-broadening 
measures would increase their tax burden, notwithstanding the government’s emphasis on 
fighting evasion.  Yet citizens’ ignorance about complex tax issues probably made them more 
receptive to the government’s legitimating appeals than to business’s explanations of the 
difference between tax evasion and tax avoidance.  
 
4. CONCLUSION 
Building direct tax capacity in developing countries is a question of substantial theoretical 
interest and practical importance, particularly when income and profits are heavily concentrated 
and consumption is heavily taxed.  This paper advances theory on direct tax reform by 
explicating two types of power that allow economic elites to shape policy outcomes: political 
power and investment power; identifying two mechanisms for circumventing associated 
obstacles to reform: mobilizing public support, or tempering elite antagonism; relating those 
mechanisms to specific strategy options; and assessing when particular strategies will be more or 
less appropriate and effective.  My framework complements research on taxation that applies 
structural, historical, or institutional approaches by focusing on strategies, a variable that 
policymakers can readily manipulate.  I argue that although significant advances are unlikely 
when economic elites have strong political and/or investment power, reform strategies can help 
governments enact incremental direct tax increases.  The room for maneuver these strategies 
create may be narrow.  Yet the modest revenue gains secured can make a difference for 
governments struggling to maintain fiscal solvency and/or expand tenuous social safety nets.  
This research not only advances theory, but also provides practical tools and guidelines for 
policymakers.  The framework presented can serve as a basis for evaluating which options are 
more or less feasible and appropriate, depending on the nature of the government’s revenue 
needs as well as the types of power economic elites possess.  Appendix 2 summarizes the 
strategies, associated techniques, potential limitations, and contextual factors affecting success.  
Three general policy implications arise.  First, incremental reform proposals may prove more 
successful than ambitious reform initiatives.  Second, the more strategies a government can 
apply simultaneously, the better the prospects for success, particularly when economic elites 
have strong and multiple sources of power.  And third, one size does not fit all: reform design 
and reform strategies must be tailored to the particular context at hand.   
Regarding debates on framing and policy design, I find that both elements matter to reform 
outcomes.  Scholars have argued that framing plays a central role in US tax politics, particularly 
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when strong moral values are invoked (Birney and Shapiro 2005, Graetz and Shapiro 2005).  
This paper provides additional evidence from developing countries indicating the importance of 
framing.  Equity appeals contributed to Chile’s modest direct tax reform successes.  By framing 
tax avoidance as immoral and unfair, the Lagos administration put business and the right on the 
defensive and created some political space for curtailing technically unjustified income-tax 
benefits.  In contrast, inconsistent and inadequate equity appeals contributed to Bolivia’s income 
tax failure; the government’s communication campaign failed to meet the minimum requirement 
of assuring the broader public that it would not pay the tax, let alone convincing them that the tax 
was a just and equitable policy appropriate for the highly unequal country.  
Yet as other authors have noted, policy design is at least as important as framing for 
managing reactions to reform (Hacker and Pierson 2005).  Almost all of the tax reform strategies 
are closely associated with either the choice and design of the tax measure itself, or the design of 
the larger reform package.  Argentina’s tax on debt is a case in which design alone sufficed to 
enact (if not sustain) reform.  The Chilean and Bolivian cases show that policy design and 
framing are often integrally related and mutually reinforcing.  In Chile, equity appeals would 
have been less effective had the tax reforms not clearly conformed to this principle.  In Bolivia, 
the proposed income tax’s lack of overt progressivity probably would have undermined even 
well-formulated and consistent equity appeals.   
Regarding literature on market reform, this paper suggests that the politics of policy change 
can be much more variable than often assumed.  Authors often categorize policy areas and the 
political dynamics they engender based on their distributional effects (Schneider 2004, Arce 
2005).  Taxation differs from other policy areas like trade liberalization or capital account 
liberalization, since tax increases impose much more predictable and immediate losses.  Yet even 
within the specific policy domain of taxing economic elites, politics vary widely, depending on 
which groups are affected and what sources of power they possess, as well as how governments 
propose to tax them and what reform strategies they employ.  These findings confirm Pierson’s 
(1993: 625) expectation that politics cannot be neatly categorized across aggregate policy types.  
Instead, a specific policy may stimulate multiple political responses that depend on the details of 
its design as well as multiple context-specific variables.  Future research on building tax capacity 
in developing countries could therefore benefit from disaggregating taxation to a more 
significant extent and conducting more comparative case studies, rather than focusing on 
aggregate reform indices or revenue data.   
Finally, this paper contributes to recent research on institutional change.  Mahoney and 
Thelen (2010) and Hall (2010) advocate greater attention to the role of power and conflict in 
bringing about institutional change; my framework brings those dimensions to the forefront of 
analysis.  Hall (2010: 219) also calls for more research on how processes of institutional change 
vary across issue domains; this paper complements that agenda by providing theory and evidence 
on how such processes may vary within a single, substantively critical issue domain—taxation.   
However, my analysis highlights limitations in Mahoney and Thelen’s (2010) innovative 
framework for analyzing gradual institutional change.  The authors distinguish four types of 
change, including displacement: replacing existing rules by new ones, and layering: adding new 
rules without removing old rules.  They theorize that layering occurs in political contexts where 
strong veto actors defend existing rules, whereas displacement occurs when veto possibilities are 
weak.  However, the distinction between layering and displacement is not necessarily 
fundamental to the politics of gradual institutional change, nor do these concepts necessarily 
align with political contexts as hypothesized.  Altering tax systems may entail layering, for 
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example, introducing new taxes into the existing system, as in Argentina and Bolivia.  Or it may 
entail displacement, for example, rewriting existing tax laws to eliminate exemptions, as in 
Chile.  Yet both modes of change occurred in contexts of strong veto possibilities posed by 
powerful economic elites.  The politics of institutional change and strategies for achieving it 
certainly varied across these cases, but in ways that Mahoney and Thelen’s framework does not 
capture.  Future research on institutional change might therefore benefit from incorporating 
additional complexity and context specificity into models, as well as assessing to what types of 
institutions theories will be most applicable. 
 
REFERENCES 
Acuña, W.  (1994).  Politics and economics in the Argentina of the nineties.  In W. C. Smith, C. 
H. Acuña, and E. Gamarra (Eds.), Democracy, markets, and structural reform in Latin 
America.  Miami: University of Miami, North-South Center. 
Alvaredo, F.  (2010).  The rich in Argentina over the twentieth century.  In A. Atkinson and T. 
Piketty (Eds.), Top incomes: A global perspective.  Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Appel, H.  (2006).  International imperatives and tax reform: Lessons from postcommunist 
Europe.  Comparative Politics 39, 43-62. 
Arnold, R. D.  (1990).  The logic of congressional action.  New Haven: Yale University Press.  
Ascher, W.  (1984).  Scheming for the poor: The politics of redistribution in Latin America. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Ascher, W.  (1989).  Risk, politics, and tax reform: Lessons from some Latin American 
experiences.  In M. Gillis (Ed.), Tax reform in developing countries.  Durham: Duke 
University Press.     
Barr, R.  (2005).  Bolivia: Another uncompleted revolution.  Latin American Politics and Society 
47  (3): 69-90. 
Barreix, A., J. Roca and L. Villela.  (2006).  Política fiscal y equidad: Resumen ejecutivo.  In A. 
Barreix, J. Roca and L. Villela (Eds.), La equidad fiscal en los países Andinos (pp. 2-65). 
Washington, D.C.: DFID, Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, Comunidad Andina. 
Bartels, L.  (2008).  Unequal democracy.  Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Bates, R., and D. D. Lien.  (1985).  A note on taxation, development, and representative 
government.  Politics and Society 14 (1): 53-70. 
Bennett, A.  (2010).  Process tracing and causal inference.  In H. Brady and D. Collier (Eds.), 
Rethinking social inquiry (2nd ed.).  Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.    
Block, F.  (1977).  The ruling class does not rule.  Socialist Revolution 33: 6-27. 
Bird, R., and J. Jun.  (2005).  Earmarking in Korean theory and practice. International Tax 
Program Papers No. 513. Institute for International Business, Rotman School of 
Management, University of Toronto.   
Bird, R., and E. Zolt.  (2005).  Redistribution via taxation: The limited role of the personal 
income tax in developing countries.  UCLA Law Review. 
Birney, M., I. Shapiro, and M. Graetz.  (2008).  The political uses of public opinion.  In I. 
Shapiro, P. A. Swenson, and D. Donno (Eds.), Divide and deal (pp. 298-340).   New York: 
New York University Press. 
Boylan, D.  (1996).  Taxation and transition: The politics of the 1990 Chilean tax reform, Latin 
American Research Review 31 (1): 7-31. 
Brautigam, D., O. Fjeldstad and M. Moore (Eds.)  (2008).  Taxation and state-building in 
developing countries.  New York: Cambridge University Press.   
 	   20 
Campbell, A., P. E. Converse, W. E. Miller, and D. E. Stokes.  (1960).  The American voter.  
New York: John Wiley.  
Conaghan, C., and J. Malloy.  (1994).  Unsettling statecraft: Democracy and neoliberalism in the 
Central Andes.  Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Collier, D.  (2011).  Understanding process tracing.  PS: Political Science and Politics 44 (4): 
823-30. 
Collier, D., H. Brady, and J. Seawright.  (2010).  Sources of leverage in causal inference: Toward 
an alternative view of methodology.  In Henry Brady and David Collier (Eds.), Rethinking 
social inquiry (2nd ed., pp. 161-199).  Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. 
Collier, D., J. LaPorte, and J. Seawright.  (2012).  Putting typologies to work: Concept 
formation, measurement, and analytical rigor.  Political Research Quarterly 65: 217-232. 
Corrales, J.  (1998).  Coalitions and corporate choices in Argentina, 1976-1994: The recent 
private sector support of privatization.  Studies in Comparative International Development 
32 (4) (Winter): 24-51.   
Cox, G., and M. McCubbins.  (2002).  The institutional determinants of economic policy 
outcomes.  In Haggard and McCubbins, eds.  Presidents, parliaments, and policy. New 
York: Cambridge.  
Eaton, K.  (2007).  Backlash in Bolivia: Regional autonomy as a reaction to indigenous 
mobilization.  Politics and Society, 35 (1): 71-102. 
Eaton, K.  (2002).  Politics and economic reforms in new democracies.  University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press.   
El Deber (2003, February 6).  Otro impuesto al salario generará más evasion.  Santa Cruz, 
Bolivia.  
El Mercurio, (2000a, September 10).  Lagos recogió observaciones de empresarios.”  Santiago, 
Chile.   
El Mercurio (2000b, October 8).  Un dolor para crecer.  Santiago, Chile.   
El Mercurio (2001a, March 14).  Lagos pidió apoyo al proyecto.  Santiago, Chile.   
El Mercurio (2001b, March 15).  Avance trámite de evasión tributaria.  Santiago, Chile.   
El Mercurio (2005a, May 7).  Presidente, deje que Soledad y Michelle se defiendan solas.  
Santiago, Chile.   
El Mercurio  (2005b, May 10).  Lagos reta a Alianza a derogar exención tributaria en 24 horas.  
Santiago, Chile.   
El Mercurio (2005c, May 11).  Gobierno no afloja en disputa con Lavín.  Santiago, Chile.   
El Mercurio (2005d, May 12).  Joaquín Lavín y las fórmulas para enfrentar la desigualdad.  
Santiago, Chile.     
El Mercurio (2005e, May 13).  Nuevo Escenario de Campaña.  Santiago, Chile.   
Etchemendy, S.  (2011).  Models of economic liberalization.  New York: Cambridge University 
Press.   
Fairfield, T.  (2010).  Business power and tax reform: Taxing income and profits in Chile and 
Argentina.  Latin American Politics and Society 52 (2): 37-71.  
Fearon, J. D.  (1991).  Counterfactuals and hypothesis testing in political science.  World Politics 
43 (2) (January): 169–95. 
Flores-Macías, G.  (2010).   Statist vs. pro-market: Explaining leftist governments’ economic 
policies in Latin America.  Comparative Politics 42 (4): 413-33. 
 	   21 
Flores-Macías, G.  (2012).  The political economy of Colombia’s “democratic security taxes.”  
Working paper.  Latin American Studies Association conference, San Francisco, May 23-
26.  
Graetz, M., and I. Shapiro.  (2005).  Death by a Thousand Cuts.  Princeton: Princeton University 
Press.  
Gamarra, E., and J. Malloy. (1995).  The patrimonial dynamics of party politics in Bolivia.”  In 
Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully (Eds.), Building democratic institutions: Party 
systems in Latin America (pp. 399-433). Stanford: Stanford University Press.  
Gelleny, R., and M. McCoy.  (2001).  Globalization and government policy independence: The 
issue of taxation.  Political Research Quarterly 54 (3): 509-29. 
Gibson, E.  (1996).  Class and conservative parties. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Goertz, G., and J. Mahoney.  (2012).  A tale of two cultures: Qualitative and quantitative 
research in the social sciences.  Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Gomez-Sabaini, J. C.  (2006).  Cohesión social, equidad y tributación.  Santiago, Chile: CEPAL.  
Gomez-Sabaini, J. C., J. P. Jiménez, and D. Rossignolo.  (2012).  Imposición a la renta personal 
y equidad en América Latina.  Santiago, Chile: CEPAL.  
Goñi, E., H. López, and L. Servén.  (2011).  Fiscal redistribution and income inequality in Latin 
America. World Development 39 (9): 1558-1569.  
Hacker, J., and P. Pierson.  (2002).  Business power and social policy: Employers and the 
formation of the American welfare state.  Politics and Society 30 (June): 277-325.  
Hacker, J., and P. Pierson.  (2005).  Abandoning the middle: The Bush tax cuts and the limits of 
democratic control.  Perspectives on Politics 3 (1) (March): 33-53.  
Hacker, J., and P. Pierson.  (2010).  Winner-take-all-politics: Public policy, political 
organization, and the precipitous rise of top incomes in the United States.  Politics and 
Society 38 (2): 152-204. 
Hall, P.  (2010).  Historical institutionalism in rationalist and sociological perspective.  In J. 
Mahoney and K. Thelen (Eds.), Explaining Institutional Change. New York: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Hirschman, A. O.  (1973).  Journeys toward progress.  New York: Twentieth Century Fund.  
Huber, E., and J. D. Stephens.  (2012).  Democracy and the left.  Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press.    
International Monetary Fund (IMF).  (2011).  Western hemisphere: Shifting winds, new policy 
challenges.  Washington, D.C: IMF. 
Jacobs, L., and R. Shapiro.  (2000).  Politicians don’t pander.  Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Kato, J.  (2003).  Regressive taxation and the welfare state.  New York: Cambridge University 
Press.  
Kingstone, P.  (2001).  Why free trade “losers” support free trade:  Industrialists and the 
surprising politics of trade reform in Brazil.  Comparative Political Studies 34 (9) 
(November): 986-1010.   
Kurtz, M.  (2009).   The social foundations of institutional order: Reconsidering war and the 
“resource curse” in third world state building.  Politics and Society 37 (4): 479-520. 
Lagos, R., and N. Eyzaguirre.  (2000, August 24).  Mensaje 178-342: Proyecto de ley que 
establece normas legales para combater la evasion tributaria.  Santiago, Chile.   
La Razón.  (2003a, February 1).  El gobierno afina el ajuste tributario.  La Paz, Bolivia.   
La Razón.  (2003b, February 4).  La crisis se va a profundizar.  La Paz, Bolivia.  
 	   22 
La Razón.  (2003c, February 10).  El rechazo a las medidas es unánime.  La Paz, Bolivia. 
La Razón.  (2003d, February 10).  Goni anuncia el impuestazo.  La Paz, Bolivia. 
La Razón.  (2003e, February 11).  Los salaries se achican.  La Paz, Bolivia. 
La Razón.  (2003f, February 11).  Todos pagarán por igual 12.5% de su salario.  La Paz, Bolivia.  
Levi, M.  (1988).  Of rule and revenue.   Berkeley: University of California Press.  
Lieberman, E.  (2003).  Race and regionalism in the politics of taxation in Brazil and South 
Africa.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Lindblom, C. E.  (1977).  Politics and markets: The world’s political economic systems.  New 
York: Basic Books. 
Luna, J. P.  (2010).  Segmented party voter linkages in Latin America: The case of the UDI.  
Journal of Latin American Studies 42 (2): 325-356. 
Mahon, J.  (2004).  Causes of tax reform in Latin America, 1977-95.  Latin American Research 
Review 99 (1) (February): 3-30. 
Mahoney, J.  (2010).   After KKV: The new methodology of qualitative research.  World Politics 
62 (1): 120-47. 
Mahoney, J., and K. Thelen (Eds.).  (2010).  Explaining institutional change. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Martin, I. and N. Gabay.  (2007).  Do visible taxes cause protest?  Tax policy and tax protest in 
rich democracies.  Paper prepared for the meeting of the RC-19.  Stockholm, September 4-
6, 2008. 
Miliband, R.  (1969).  The state and capitalist society.  New York: Basic Books. 
Mills, C. W.  (1956).  The power elite.  Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Mkandawire, T.  (2010).  On tax efforts and colonial heritage in Africa.  Journal of Development 
Studies 46 (10): 1647-1669.  
Moore, M.  (2004).  Revenues, state formation and the quality of governance in developing 
countries.  International Political Science Review  25 (3): 297-319.  
Murillo, V.  (2009).  Political competition, partisanship, and policy making in Latin American 
public utilities.  New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Olson, M. (1965).  The logic of collective action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Perry, G., O. A., H. López, W. Maloney, and L. Servén.  (2006).  Poverty reduction and growth.  
Washington, D.C: World Bank.  
Pierson, P.  (1993).  When effect becomes cause: Policy feedback and political change.  World 
Politics 45 (4): 595-628. 
Pierson, P.  (1994).  Dismantling the welfare state? Reagan, Thatcher, and the politics of 
retrenchment.  New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Piketty, T., E. Saez, and S. Stantcheva.  (2011).  Optimal taxation of top labor incomes: A tale of 
three elasticities.  Working Paper no. 17616.  Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic 
Research.  
Prichard, W.  (2009).  The politics of taxation and implications for accountability in Ghana 1981-
2008.  Working paper 330.  Institute for Development Studies, Sussex.     
Przeworski, A., and M. Wallerstein.  (1988).  Structural dependence of the state on capital.  
American Political Science Review 82 (1) (March): 11-29. 
Roemer, J.  (1999).  Does democracy engender justice?  In I. Shapiro and C. Hacker- Cordón 
(Eds.), Democracy’s Value.  New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Saez, E.  (2001).  Using elasticities to derive optimal income tax rates.  Review of Economic 
Studies 68 (January): 205-229.   
 	   23 
Schamis, H.  (1999).  Distributional coalitions and the politics of economic reform in Latin 
America.  World Politics 51 (January): 250. 
Schneider, A.  (2012).  State-building and tax regimes in Central America.  New York: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Schneider, B. R.  (2004).   Organizing interests and coalition in the politics of market reform in 
Latin America.  World Politics 56 (3) (April): 456-79.  
Shleifer, A., and Daniel T.  (2000).  Without a map: Political tactics and economic reform in 
Russia.  Cambridge: MIT Press.  
Silva, E.  (1996).  The state and capital in Chile.  Boulder: Westview Press. 
Slater, D.  (2010).  Ordering power.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Steinmo, S.  (1993).  Taxation and democracy: Swedish, British, and American approaches to 
financing the modern state.  New Haven: Yale University Press.  
Tilly, C.  (1975).  The formation of national states in Western Europe.   Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Timmons, J.  (2005).  The fiscal contract: States, taxes, and public services.  World Politics 57: 
530-67. 
Van Evera, S.  (1997).  Guide to methods for students of political science.  Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press.  
Weyland, K.  (1997).  Growth with equity in Chile’s new democracy?  Latin American Research 
Review 32 (1): 37-67. 
Weyland, K.  (2002).  The politics of market reform in fragile democracies: Argentina, Brazil, 
Peru, and Venezuela.  Princeton: Princeton University Press.   
Wilensky, H.  (2002).  Rich democracies:  Political economy, public policy, and performance.  
Berkeley: University of Berkeley Press.  
Wilson, J.Q.  (1980).   The politics of regulation.   In J.Q. Wilson (Ed.), The politics of 
regulation.  New York: Basic Books.       
Winters, J.  (1996).  Power in motion.  Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 
Author’s Interviews 
ABA.  2006.  Banking association informant.  Buenos Aires.  Oct. 19. 
ADEBA.  2006.  Banking association informant.  Buenos Aires.  Oct. 18. 
Baglini, R.  2006.  UCR Senator.  Buenos Aires, Argentina.  Sept. 13. 
CChC.  2005.  Construction association staff member.  Santiago, Chile.  Dec. 6.  
CEPB.  2006.  President, Confederación de Empresarios Privados de Bolivia.  La Paz, Bolivia.  
Dec. 15.    
CPC.  2005.  Former President, Confederación de Producción y Comercio.  Santiago, Chile. Dec. 
13.    
Economy Ministry.a  2006.  Former Secretary of the Treasury (1996-99).  Buenos Aires, 
Argentina.  Aug. 8.   
Economy Ministry.b 2006. Former Subsecretary of Tax Policy (1996-1999).  Buenos Aires, 
Argentina. Sept. 4.   
Economy Ministry.c  2007.  Former Argentine Economy Minister (1999-2001).  Santiago, Chile. 
April 4.   
Economy Ministry.d  2006.  Former Secretary of Public Revenue (1999-2001).  Buenos Aires, 
Argentina.  May 18.   
Finance Ministry.a  2007.  Former Finance Minister (2000-05).  Santiago, Chile.  March 25.  
 	   24 
Finance Ministry.b.  2005.  Santiago, Chile.  Oct. 13. 
Finance Ministry.c   2005.  Santiago, Chile. Oct. 18.   
Finance Ministry.d  2006.  Former Vice Minister of Tax Policy.  La Paz, Bolivia.  Dec. 13.   
Finance Ministry.e  2007.  Former Finance Minister (2002-03).  La Paz, Bolivia.  Feb. 8.    
Finance Ministry.f   2007.  Former Finance Minister (2004).  La Paz, Bolivia.  March 9.   
Finance Ministry.g  2007.  Former Vice-Minister of Tax Policy.  La Paz, Bolivia.  March 10.   
Finance Ministry.h  2006.  Vice-Ministry of Tax Policy informant.  La Paz, Bolivia. Dec. 13.   
FDD.  2012.   Fundación Democracia y Desarrollo, Santiago, Chile.  Telephone interview.   
Lagos, R.  2006.  Former Chilean President (2000-05).  Berkeley, CA.  Sept. 20.   
PDC 2007.  Christian Democratic Senator.  Santiago, Chile.  March 26.   
Private Sector.a  2005.  Santiago, Chile. Sept. 6. 
Private Sector.b  2005.  Santiago, Chile. Nov. 30.  
Prat, F.  2005.  Former UDI senator.  Santiago, Chile.  Nov. 28.  
Sánchez de Lozada, G. 2010.  Former Bolivian President (1993-97, 2002-03). Telephone 
interview.  Oct. 26.   
SOFOFA. 2005.  Industry association staff member.  Santiago, Chile.  Nov. 18. 
Tax Agency.  2005.  Former tax agency director (1990-2002).  Santiago, Chile. Dec. 12. 
UDI 2005.  UDI Deputy.  Santiago, Chile. Dec. 23.  
 
 
Appendix 1: Process-Tracing Tests 
 
Methodologists have produced a wealth of literature on process tracing in recent years 
explicating the underlying logic of causal inference.  This appendix reviews the central ideas in 
this literature and illustrates how process tracing forms the basis for my case analyses of the 
causal effect of reform strategies in Section 3, with specific reference to Chile’s 2005 tax reform.   
Process-tracing entails within-case analysis, which provides a distinct source of causal 
leverage from the cross-case, correlation-based inference employed in regression analysis.  The 
pieces of evidence drawn from close analysis of a single case can be labeled “causal process 
observations” (CPOs) (Collier et. al. 2010, Mahoney 2010).  Researchers use CPOs to 
inductively build theory and to evaluate causal hypotheses.  Drawing on Van Evera (1997), 
Bennett (2010) and Collier (2011) elaborate four evidence-based tests undergirding causal 
inference in process-tracing:   
 
Straw-in-the-Wind Test:  Passing the test increases the plausibility of the hypothesis in question 
but does not confirm it.  Failing weakens the hypothesis, but does not eliminate it.   
Hoop Test:  Passing, or “jumping” through the hoop, increases the plausibility of the hypothesis 
but does not confirm it.  If the hypothesis fails the test, it is eliminated.     
Smoking-Gun Test:  Passing confirms the hypothesis.  Failing does not eliminate the hypothesis.  
Doubly-Decisive Test:  Passing confirms the hypothesis and eliminates rivals.  
 
These tests can be classified by whether passing is necessary to establish causation (hoop; 
doubly-decisive), sufficient (smoking-gun; doubly-decisive), or neither (straw-in-the-wind) 
(Collier 2011: 825).  In practice, the terms necessary and sufficient are heuristics that need not be 
interpreted rigidly (Collier 2011).  Hence a smoking-gun test may be viewed as strongly 
affirming a hypothesis, as opposed to definitely confirming the hypothesis, or a particular test 
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may be treated as having intermediate diagnostic power compared to the stronger and weaker 
types elaborated above.  In essence, the four tests increase or decrease the likelihood that a 
hypothesis is correct to varying degrees, based on different logicl criteria.  
In light of these tests, CPOs may provide more or less decisive evidence in favor of or 
against a causal hypothesis (Bennett 2010).  Process tracing therefore resembles Bayesian 
analysis, where the researcher asks how surprising the evidence would be if a hypothesis were 
correct (Bennett 2010).  An inference therefore cannot be judged merely by the number of 
observations deployed.  However, diverse sources and types of observations strengthen 
inference.    
The following discussion explicitly illustrates how my analysis of Chile’s 2005 reform 
draws on multiple CPOs and different types of tests.  Where relevant, I discuss additional 
evidence not included in the article given space constraints.  While I discuss the key diagnostic 
pieces of evidence, the causal inferences are grounded in a much larger body of comparative case 
knowledge acquired through extensive field research.    
   
Chile’s Stockholder Tax Subsidy Reform 
 
Case Summary:  During the 2005 presidential campaign, right candidate Lavín blamed Chile’s 
persistent inequality on the left and accused President Lagos of failing to deliver his promise of 
growth with equity.  Lagos responded by publicly challenging the right to eliminate 57 bis, a 
highly regressive tax benefit for wealthy stockholders that he called “a tremendous support for 
inequality.”  The right accepted the challenge and voted in favor of eliminating the tax benefit in 
congress, deviating from its prior position on this policy and the preferences of its core business 
constituency.  
 
The following three hypotheses encompass the main components of my argument regarding why 
the right voted in favor of the reform:  
 
Hypothesis 1:  Lagos’ equity appeal motivated the right to accept the reform, due to 
concern over public opinion.     
Hypothesis 2:  The timing of the equity appeal—during a major electoral campaign—
contributed to its success. 
Hypothesis 3:  The high issue-salience of inequality contributed to the equity appeal’s 
success.   
 
The following four observations, drawn from different sources, provide indirect, circumstantial 
support for Hypothesis 1:     
 
Observation 1a (p. 23):  The Lagos administration considered eliminating 57 bis in the 
2001 Anti-Evasion reform but judged it politically infeasible given business-right 
opposition (interview: Finance Ministry.a 2005).   
Observation 1b:  The Lagos administration subsequently tried to reach an agreement with 
business to eliminate 57 bis without success (interview, Finance Ministry.b 2005).   
Observation 1c:  Initiatives to eliminate the exemption were blocked in 1995 and 1998 due 
to right opposition.  (Sources: congressional records, multiple interviews) 
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Observation 1d:  Previous efforts to eliminate 57 bis did not involve concerted equity 
appeals.  Although Concertación governments had mentioned equity in prior efforts, 
technical language predominated, and government statements focused much more on 
57 bis’ failure to stimulate investment rather than its regressive distributive impact 
(congressional records, La Segunda, March 27, 1998, El Mercurio, April 1, 1998, 
interview: Ffrench-Davis 2005).  
Inference:  These observations suggest that right votes to eliminate 57 bis would have been 
highly unlikely without some new, distinct political dynamic.  Lagos’ strong, high-
profile equity appeal, in the unusual context of electoral competition from the right on 
the issue of inequality, becomes a strong candidate for explaining the right’s acceptance 
of the reform.    
Hypothesis 1 passes Straw-in-the-Wind Tests:  The evidence is consistent with the 
hypothesis but is not decisive.     
 
The following four observations provide more decisive evidence supporting Hypothesis 1 on the 
equity appeal’s importance, and Hypothesis 2 on its timing: 
 
Observation 2a (p. 24):  Lavín’s advisors attributed Lagos’ narrow victory in the 1999 
presidential election to the right’s rejection of a labor-rights bill that the center-left 
government sent to congress during the campaign.  The right compared the 1999 bill to 
the 2005 bill eliminating 57 bis.  Lavín advisors commented: “The center-right is not 
willing to fall into the 1999 trap again.”  (El Mercurio, 2005e)  
Observation 2b, 2c:  Two additional articles from the same newspaper, which is widely 
recognized as having strong ties to the right and economic elites, referred to similar 
points regarding the right’s comparison of the 1999 bill and the 2005 bill.  (El Mercurio 
2005d, El Mercurio, June 15, 2005.) 
Observation 2d (p. 25):  A right-party senator explained: “the opposition demonstrated that 
this time it would accept things that usually it was not disposed to accept so as not to 
harm the presidential option—in this case it would do something popular.”  (Interview: 
UDI 2005)  
Observation 2e:  An informant from the right party UDI’s think tank, who served as a 
technical advisor to the UDI’s congressional bloc, explained: “the government said we 
have to eliminate 57 bis and I said that is a mistake, and they [the right legislators] said 
‘no, we will lose votes if we don’t approve it.’”  (Interview, Instituto Libertad y 
Desarrollo, Santiago, Chile, Nov. 25, 2005.) 
Inference:  These five observations clearly indicate that the right was concerned that its 
presidential candidate would lose votes if right-party legislators defended 57 bis.  Given 
the reasonable assumption that average citizens would not have been familiar with, or at 
least would not have been thinking about 57 bis—an obscure tax benefit for wealthy 
stockowners—prior to the exchange between Lavín and Lagos, we can attribute the 
right’s manifest concern over public opinion to Lagos’ equity appeal.       
Hypothesis 1 passes Smoking-Gun Tests:  Observations 2a-2e strongly support the 
hypothesis that the equity appeal motivated the right to accept the reform.  This 
evidence would be extremely surprising if the null hypothesis that the equity appeal did 
not have an effect were correct.   
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Inference:  These observations also establish the importance of timing for the equity 
appeal’s success.  Observations 2a-2c most clearly ground this inference, since the right 
drew lessons from a prior reform that was also proposed during a presidential 
campaign, as opposed to some other similar reform that was not proposed during a 
presidential campaign (e.g. the 2001 Anti-Evasion reform).  Timing is also implicit in 
Observations 2d-2e, given express concern regarding the outcome of the presidential 
election, and the right legislator’s reference to “this time” as distinct from other times.   
Hypothesis 2 passes Smoking-Gun Tests:  Observations 2a-2c provide decisive evidence 
that the electoral timing mattered.  Observations 2d-2e also lend strong support to the 
hypothesis, but they give rise to weaker smoking-gun tests because they are not as 
decisive as observations 2a-2c.      
 
In this case, a few decisive observations strongly affirm Hypotheses 1 and 2.  Observations 2a-2e 
are particularly convincing because we would not expect sources from the right to acknowledge 
that a strategy implemented by the left affected the right’s behavior.   
 
Additional evidence from high-level government informants corroborates Hypothesis 1 and 
supports Hypothesis 3 regarding issue salience: 
 
Observation 3a (p. 24):  A Finance Ministry official observed that 57 bis “was a pure 
transfer of resources to rich people; there was no way to argue differently.  …It was not 
possible for the right to oppose the reform after making that argument about 
inequality.” (interview: Finance Ministry.b 2005).   
Observation 3b:  Former president Lagos maintained: “57 bis never would have been 
eliminated if I had not taken Lavín at his word”—i.e. if Lagos had not taken seriously 
Lavín’s publicly-professed concern over inequality.  (interview, Lagos 2006)   
Inference:  These observations suggests that the high-profile exchange on inequality 
between Lavín and Lagos, which culminated in Lagos’ equity appeal, was critical for 
making the reform possible.  Implicit in these quotations is the understanding that the 
high issue-salience of inequality—given the Bishops’ denunciation of persistent 
inequality that motivated Lavín to blame lack of progress on Lagos (p. 23) as well as 
the subsequent exchange on inequality between Lavín and Lagos—mattered for reform.  
Since we know efforts to eliminate 57 bis failed on prior occasions, we can infer that 
the unusually high salience of inequality contributed to the equity appeal’s success.  
Hypotheses 1 and 3 pass (weaker) Smoking-Gun tests:  These pieces of evidence 
strongly support the hypotheses, although they are less decisive for Hypothesis 1 than 
observations 2a-2e—it is less surprising for the government to claim success for its 
strategy than for the right to acknowledge the strategy’s impact.     
 
In sum, core Hypothesis 1 passes straw-in-the-wind tests corresponding to four observations, 
smoking-gun tests corresponding to five observations, and weaker smoking-gun tests based on 
two additional observations.  This evidence, particularly the smoking-gun observations, strongly 
affirms the hypothesis that equity appeals facilitated the reform.   
  
Several CPOs listed above also rule out a plausible institutional explanation that challenges 
Hypothesis 1:   
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Hypothesis 4 (rival):  The right would have accepted eliminating 57 bis regardless of the 
equity appeal, because Chile’s institutionalized party system and stable rules of the 
game motivate cross-partisan cooperation in congress (drawing on Flores 2010).   
Observations 1a-1c:  The right opposed multiple prior attempts to eliminate 57 bis.  
Inference:  Since institutional incentives did not change significantly from the 1990s 
through the 2000s, if institutions created sufficient incentives for the right to accept the 
reform in 2005, they should have done so on prior occasions as well.   
Hypothesis 4 fails Hoop Tests:  The hypothesis is ruled out with respect to elimination of 
57 bis.   
 
Appendix 2: Strategies Overview 
 --Figure 2 here--  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1The Interamerican Development Bank, the Woodrow Wilson Center, the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, and the UK Department For International 
Development have shown growing interest in strengthening progressive taxation in developing 
countries.  
2Exceptions include Boylan 1996 and Weyland 1997.  
3Flores-Macias (2012) finds that in some contemporary cases, internal war may help build direct 
tax capacity.  However, this observation provides little guidance for policymakers in peaceful 
states.    
4See also www.wilsoncenter.org/event/taxation-and-equality-latin-america   For recent views to 
the contrary, see Bird and Zolt 2005.  
5Goñi et al.’s 2011 otherwise comprehensive analysis of fiscal redistribution in Latin America 
neglects this critical revenue-raising role of progressive direct taxation.  
6Pierson’s (1994) work on welfare-retrenchment strategies serves as a model in many of these 
regards.  
7On structural power, see Block 1977, Lindblom 1977, Przeworski and Wallerstein 1988, 
Winters 1996, Hacker and Pierson 2002.  On instrumental power, see Mills 1956, Miliband 
1969, Hacker and Pierson 2002.   
8I borrow the term obfuscation from Pierson (1994: 19-22), who elaborates a similar class of 
strategies to achieve a different goal: welfare state retrenchment. 
9The VAT, which is hidden within the final price of the good, is often described as a low-
visibility tax.  However, the VAT is nonetheless frequently subject to consumer protest (Moore 
2004: 312).  On this point as well as an extensive discussion of conceptualizing and measuring 
tax visibility, see Martin and Gabay 2007.   
10See for example: Campbell et. al. 1960, Roemer 1999, Luna 2010. 
11Hirschman (1973: 267, 217) draws this conclusion regarding land taxes.  Likewise, US public 
opinion on taxes paid by the wealthy is described as “low intensity” (Graetz and Shapiro 2005: 
254) or “remarkably superficial” (Bartels 2008: 176).      
12Emphasizing national security helped South African governments secure elite cooperation to 
finance war efforts (Lieberman 2003: 140-48).  In post-communist countries, appealing to 
national prestige facilitated tax reforms required for EU membership (Appel 2011).  
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13Melo 2007, drawing on Tommasi and Spiller 2000 and Levitsky and Murillo 2005.  Chile is 
considered to have stronger and more stable institutions than Argentina and Bolivia.  Regarding 
other institutional variables that may affect prospects for legislating reforms, Chile and 
Argentina both have executives with strong institutional prerogatives, all three countries had 
party-oriented electoral systems that promoted discipline in congress, and none of the countries 
had institutions that fostered legislative gridlock during the studied period.   
14Although relative success across these cases appears correlated with institutional and party 
system strength and stability, the relationship does not hold across the larger set of cases from 
which these examples are drawn.  These factors therefore provide at most incomplete 
explanations.  15Business did not embrace the final version of the reform, but informants agreed that it was 
much more acceptable than the original bill (interviews: CPC 2005, CChC 2005, SOFOFA 2005, 
Private Sector.b 2005).  	  	  
16In Chile, congress first votes “in general” on reforms (yes or no); if an approved reform is 
multifaceted, a second vote “in particular” (line-item) may be held in which each measure is 
voted on separately.  
17See Fairfield (2010) for further discussion of these sources of power. 
18This tax was eliminated in 1986 given weak administrative capacity, which subsequently 
improved (interview, Finance Ministry.g 2007).  The absence of a personal income tax facilitated 
generalized tax evasion. Businesses could simultaneously avoid the corporate tax and transfer 
profits to owners and executives tax-free by paying inflated salaries (interviews: Finance 
Ministry.d 2006, Finance Ministry.f 2007).   
19However, the wealth tax provoked intense business opposition, a drawback of highly targeted, 
visibly progressive taxes.  
20See Cox and McCubbins 2002 and Flores-Macías 2010.   
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Figure 1: Reform Strategies 
 
